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A decade of decentralization has hopefully delivered benefits to Indonesia in the 
form of enhanced community welfare achieved via regional autonomy and fiscal 
decentralization.  The implementation of decentralization has seen an evolution of 
the legal framework governing regional autonomy and fiscal decentratization, the 
details of which have been modified twice in the intervening periodi.  
 
Central government fiscal transfers to sub-national governments have underpinned 
the decentralization process and contributed significantly to regional development.  
The main mechanisms for those transfers have been the General Purpose Fund 
(DAU), the Special Purpose Fund (DAK) and the Shared Revenue Fund (DBH).  In 
addition, the central government has transferred funding directly to the regions 
(bypassing local budgets) to support delegated (dekonsentrasi) or co-administered 
(tugas pembantuan) tasks and functions, carried out in the regions on behalf of the 
central government.   This process has seen a multiplication of ways in which 
central government funds have been transferred to the regions, some of which have 
gone beyond the parameters laid down in Law No. 33/2004 concerning Fiscal 
Balance between the Center and the Regions (dana perimbangan).   
 
The enactment of Law No. 28/2009 concerning Regional Taxes, Charges and Fees 
(pajak dan retribusi daerah), which decreed that taxes on land and buildings (PBB) 
and levies on the acquisition of rights over land and buildings (BPHTB) should 
henceforth be collected by sub-national governments had implications for the dana 
perimbangan system which disbursement arrangements for those two sets of taxes.  
In other words, law No. 33/2004 had been overtaken by events and was no longer 
playing role it was meant to play.  
 
Against this background, Seknas FITRA thought it important to undertake research 
on how the dana perimbangan system might be made fairer and more equitable.  It 
was Fitra’s hope that such research would make a contribution to the revision and 
improvement of Law No. 33/2004.  The overall aim of the research was to provide a 
snapshot of the effectiveness or otherwise of the current system as a basis for 
formulating a better one for the future.  
 
The research employed a qualitative approach based on data collected, a study of 
documents, in depth interviews and focus group discussions (FDGs).  It comprised 
research both at the national level and in the regions where 4 case studies were 
undertaken specifically to garner information at the grassroots through a number of 
in depth interviews and FDGs.  The four case study areas were chosen for their 
geographic spread and for being representative of high and low levels of fiscal 
capacity and poverty. Of the many options available, it was decided to do the case 
studies in the city of Samarinda and the kabupatens of Musi Banyuasin, Cilicap and 
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Fiscal balance between the center and the regions became an issue when   
decentralization was introduced, as that process involved the handover of functions 
by the central government to the regions.  One of the underlying principles of fiscal 
balance is that “money should follow functions”, which means that when functions 
and responsibilities are divided up among levels of government the provision of 
funding needed to discharge those functions and responsibilities should be an 
integral part of the process.  So it is entirely appropriate to ask whether the current  
procedures for achieving fiscal balance between the central government and 
regional governments in Indonesia are proportional, fair, democratic and in accord 
with each region’s potential, situation and needs.   
 
The principle that money should follow functions is not reflected in Indonesia’s 
dana perimbangan system. Although transfers to the regions have risen 
significantly in nominal terms over the past five years, the total amounts transferred 
are not yet proportionate, as they have remained below the level of 31%-34% of the 
total national state budget (APBN) (see Grahpic 1). Leaving aside the five key areas 
of central government responsibility, it is sub-national or local governments 
(pemerintah daerah) which, in this era of regional autonomy, are required to take 
the lead on the delivery of community services.  And it is precisely in this area that  
“money should follow functions” principle is being observed in the breach.  One 
reason for this is apparent at the institutional level, where we find that the 
devolution of functions to the regions and the issue of center-regional fiscal balance 
are governed by two separate pieces of legislation.  The distribution of functions is 
governed by the provisionis of the law on local government which falls under the 
purview of the Minister of Home Affairs, whereas the law on the fiscal balance 
transfers system is the bailiwick of the Minister of Finance.   And, of course, it is no 
secret that clashes of institutional egos continues to be an impediment to consistent 
application of the law in Indonesia. 
  
The capacity of local kabupaten and city governments to meet the demands 
made of them by regional autonomy depends on dana perimbangan provided by 
the central government. While the proportion of of the APBN transferred to the 
regions has remained unchanged, the extent to which local governments have 
depended upon central government transfers remains very great indeed.  Thus, 80% 
of the total budgets of kabupaten governments comes from dana perimbangan 
transferred to them to help them meet their decentralized responsibilities.  City 
governments also depend heavily on dana perimbangan, albeit to a lesser extent 
than kabupatens.  For their part, provincial governments are even less dependent 
are less dependent on dana perimbangan because they have more extensive taxing 
powers then kabupatens and cities. As for city and kabupaten governments, the 
former generally have more sources of revenue (especially from taxation) than the 
latter which is why they are less dependent on dana perimbangan than kabupatens.  
Graphic 2 below illustrates the inconsistency mbaran Grafik 2. di bawah ini juga 
menunjukan inkonsitensi, bahwa titik otonomi daerah berada pada Kabupaten/Kota 














Regional fiscal transfers do not take account of the principle that all citizens are 
equal. Article 23 of the Constitution states that the national budget shall be 
implemented in order to best attain the properity of the people.   The thinking 
underlying this statement is that properity is a basic right of every citizen and is one 
of the purposes of Indonesia’s existence as a state. Accordingly, fiscal links between 
the center and the regions should be based on the right of every citizen to be treated 
equally.  But Graphic 3 illustrates the exent of the divergence between regions in 
terms of per capita fiscal transfers.  The kabupaten receiving the highest level of 
transfers per capita (Tana Tidung) gets 127 times more funding than the area 
receiving the lowest  (the kabupaten of Bogor).    
 
The types of dana perimbangan being transferred to the regions are becoming 
more numerous, do not have a basis in law and are running the risk of widening 
the gap between sub-national government areas.  This statement is most 
applicable to “adjustment funds” (dana penyesuaian).  When first introduced, this 
funding mechanism waa meant to make up for shortfalls in dana perimbangan 
transfers but, right from 2008, it was also being used to make good gaps resulting 
from the dropping of the “hold harmless” principle as well as to fund ad hoc 
programs. In 2008 the dana penyesuaian program was known as Fund for 
Infrastructure and Public Facilities (Dana Infrastruktur Sarana dan Prasarana (DISP)), 
but by 2009 it had been expanded to include Fund to Strengthen Fiscal Decentralization 
to Speed up Regional Development (Dana Penguatan Desentralisasi Fiskal Percepatan 
Pembangunan Daerah (DPDF PPD).  In 2010 two additional components of the 
program appeared: Fund to Strengthen Local Infrastructure and Public Facilities (Dana 
Penguatan Infrastruktur dan Prasarana Daerah (DPIPD)) and Fund to Speed up 
Development of Educational Infrastructure (Dana Percepatan Infrastruktur Pendidikan 
(DPIP)).  Indeed, in 2010 and 2011 there were seven different kinds of dana 
penyessuaian.  But in Law No. 33/2004 governing fiscal transfers from the center to 
the regions, there is no mention at all of dana penyesuaian programs, which are 
being used to accommodate funding in sectors covered both other legal provisions.  
If dana penyesuaian programs are allowed to continue unchecked without being 
regulated by clear regulations and formulae, they could undermine the very purpose 
of the dana perimbangan system which is to remove fiscal imbalalnces between sub-
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Rata-rata Prov. Rata-rata Kab. Rata-rata Kota
Grafik 2 Trend Dana  Perimbangan Pada Kab/Kota 
2008-2011 
Pendapatan Dana Perimbangan % Dana Perimbangan
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Table 1.  Types of Dana Penyesuaian 2008 - 2010 
2009 2010 2011 
1. Funds to top up DAU grants 
for local civil service teachers 
2. Funds to top us DAU grants 
for strengthening fiscal 
decentralization 
3. Shortfalls in DAK transfers. 
1. Funds to top up allowances for 
local civil service teachers 
2. Regional incentives funding 
3. Shortfalls in DAK transfers 
4. Shortfalls in infrastructure 
funding 
5. Funds to strengthen fiscal 
decentaralization to speed up 
regional development 
6. Funds to strengthen local 
infrastructure and public 
facilities 
7. Funds to speed up 
development of educational 
infrastructure 
1. Funds to supplement income 
of local civil service teachers 
2. Regional incentives funding 
3. Allowances for the teaching 
prefession 
4. School operational funding 
5. Local infrastructure 
adjustment funding 
6. Shortfalls in payments for 
infrastructure and public 
facilities in west Papua 
7. Funds to speed up the 
development of local 
infrastructrure 
Source: Put together from APBN legislation covering fiscal years 2008-2011. 
 
Infrastructure adjustment funding has damaged the dana perimbangan system.  
Two components of the 2011 dana penyesuaian program (the DPID and DPPID) 
have the potential to damage the dana perimbangan system (see Graphics 4 & 5 for 
the DPID and Table 2 for the DPPID). The DPID program for 2011 takes no account 
of poverty levels or fiscal capacity in targeted areas.  As can be seen in Graphs 4 & 5, 
the DPID’s lack of allocation criteria meant that 76 areas with poverty levels above 
the national average (that is, with poverty indices greater than 1) did not receive 
any DPID funding, whereas 149 areas with poverty levels below the national 
average (that is, with poverty indices less than 1) received DPID transfers 
nonetheless. The DPID program also served to widen the gap between regions in 
terms of fiscal capacity. Thus, 87 areas with levels of fiscal capacity below the 
national average (that is, with fiscal indices less than 1) did not receive any DPID 
funding, whereas 65 areas with levels of fiscal capacity above the national average 




The DPPID also takes no account of local conditions and so it too can produce unjust 
outcomes. As can be seen in Table 2, the city of Sabang, whose population size, 
number of sub-districts (kecamatan) and landmass are all relatively quite small, 
received DPPID funds nonetheless.  But the kapupaten of Southwest Aceh, which is 
far bigger than Sabang on all counts (population, number of kecamatans and 
landmass), received not one rupiah of DPPID funding.   
 
Tablel 2. Comparison of DPPID Allocations in  Two Areas in the Province ofAceh 
No Area Population Kecamatan Landmass DPPID for 
Roads 
DPID  for 
Roads 
1 City of Sabang 35 220 2 118 km2 18 
billion 
34.6 billion 
2 Kab.of  Southwest 
Aceh 









































































































Graphic 5. DPID 2011 Based on Fiscal  
Indices 
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The legislative framework governing dana perimbangan needs to be made more 
uniform.  The enactment of law of Law No. 39/2007 concerning Tobacco Imposts 
and Law No. 28/2009 on Regional Taxes, Charges and Fees (UU PDRD) led to a lack 
of uniformity of legal provisions relating to dana perimabagan.  The law on tobacco 
imposts provided that revenue from imposts on tobacco should be shared between 
the center and sub-national governments via the DBH mechanism, but there is no 
provision for that in the law governing dana perimbangan.  It’s a similar story in the 
case of the UU PDRD which gave local governments the authority to collect taxes on 
land and buildings and levies on the acquisition of rights over land and buildings, 
both of which were previously components in DBH transfers governed by the law on 
dana perimbangan. So on these grounds too, Law No. 33/2004 governing dana 
perimbangan should be revised.   
  
General Purpose Fund (DAU) 
 
Local governments are being disadvantaged because of the difference between 
the amount of DAU funding they should be receiving and the amount actually 
approved in the APBN. According to article 27 of Law No. 33/2004, the total 
amount of DAU funding each year should amount to at least 26% of total net 
domestic revenue included in the national budget (APBN).  It is further stated in 
explanatory nates on this article that “net domestic revenue” comprises tax and non-
tax receipts less national level receipts which are shared with local governments via 
the DBH. But, in practice, DAU allocations since 2008 have always been below the 
legally prescribed level.    This situation has arisen because factors reducing the 
level of net dometic revenue continue to multiply, not just in the form of revene 
shared via the DBH but also subsidies and “earmarked revenue”.  All this means that 
local governments are losing out compared to what the law entitles them to, as 
Table 3 makes clear.  
 
Tabel 3.  Difference between DAU Levels Mandated in UU No. 33 and Those 
Provided for in APBNs 
(Rupiah, billions) 
DAU Levels 2008 2009 2010 2011 
DAU à la UU No. 33  234 230.15   200 451.34   234 229.81   277 804.90  
DAU à la APBN 179 507.10 186 414.10 203 606.50 225 532.80 
Difference  54 723.05   14 037.24   30 623.31   52 272.10  
Source: Data put together from APBN budget documents for fiscal years 2006-2011 
 
The current formula for calculating DAU levels encourages local governments to 
waste money on civil servants and to split up to form new local government 
areas. The inclusion of civil service costs in the current formula for calculating DAU 
allocations means that the formula reflects neither local needs nor the fiscal 
imbalances between local government areas. Nor does it reward local governments 
which reduce their expenditure on civil servants or discourage  moves to set up yet 
more local government areas by splitting existing ones in two (a process called 
pemekaran daerah).   Graph 6 depicts expenditure patterns on civil servants which 
have constantly been on the up as a proportion of DAU transfers. This means that in 
practice DAU allocations cannot fulfil their purpose of reducing sub-national fiscal 
imbalance because they are fully expended on civil service related costs.  Indeed, 
FITRA’s research on local government budgets (APBD) for 2011 indicates that more 
than half of all kabupaten and city governments are speding over half of their entire 
budgets on civil service costs.  In the case of newly autonomous areas too, civil 
service costs are being met from DAU funding – an obvoius incentive for areas 
contemplating pesmekaran daerah.  
 
























The variables used in the formula for calculating DAU disbursements are “proxy 
variables” which do not reflect the actual needs of local government areas.  The 
formula calculateas an area’s fiscal need on the basis of its population, its landmass, 
its construction costs index, its human development index and its level of local GDP 
per capita.    Although Indonesia is an archipelagic state with maritime zones three 
times larger than its landmass, the size of an area’s maritime zone is not one of 
variables in the DAU formula.  The use of human development index as a variable is 
not appropriate because the data on which it is based is hard to obtain and does not 
change significantly from year to year.   Graphic 7 shows that local GDP does not    
affect the level of DAU funding which an area receives.  Furthermore, the variables 
currently used do not directly reflect what local governments need, in this era of 
local autonomy, to meet local demand for basic services.   
 
 
The formula used for calculating DAU allocations is difficult to model and lacks 
a dispute settlement mechanism. The formula uses a number of variables the 
calculation of which requires a range of data and various weightings. The weight 
given to each element in the formula is provided by the Williamson Index. This 
makes it difficult for local governments to understand the basis for the allocations 
they receive and to model their calculation on the basis of data available to them.   
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Graphic 6 Civil Service Costs as a Proportion of DAU 
Dana Alokasi Umum Pegawai (BTL) % Pegawai-DAU
 





























PDRB per kapita Juta 
Grafik 7 DAU/Kapita Tahun 2010 Berdasarkan 
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are in accord with local data available to them.  This situation can give rise to 
allegations of bias in DAU allocations for unspecified political reasons.   
Special Purpose Funds (DAK) 
 
 
The DAK is moving further and further away from its basic raison d’être which 
is to provide local funding for special activities undertaken in support of 
national priorities. The basic reason for this situation is that the activities targeted 
by DAK funding have diversified to such an extent that it is no longer clear which 
national interest is being prioritized in a particular area.   In 2005 seven fields of 
ativitiy received DAK funding but by 2011 the number had jumped to nineteen.  The 
need to fund such a large number of activities has led to a progressive reduction in 
the amount of DAK funding directed at any one field of activity (see Table 4).   
 
Table  4. DAK  by  Activity, Funding Level and Recipient Area 2005-2011 








as fraction of all 
local government 
areas 




 (Rp. million) 
2005 7 3 977.7 379/473 7 674.9 
2006 7 11 566.1 434/473 22 102.8 
2007 11 16 237.8 434/498 32 684.7 
2008 11 20 787.3 476/528 40 539.1 
2009 11 24 707.4 506/530 47 456.1 
2010 11 21 138.4 518/530 42 134.7 
2011 19 25 232.8 520/530 48 524.6 
 
 
The set of criteria used for allocating DAK funding are not appropriate. The 
three criteria used to identify areas to receive DAK transfers (general, technical and 
special criteria) end up negating each other.  According to the legislation, DAK 
funding is supposed to be directed to areas with limited capacity to support the 
attainment of a particular national priority.  But because of the nature of the criteria 
used and because the number of targeted activities has been constantly increasing, 
ipso facto almost every local government area in Indonesia is now receiving some 
degree of DAK funding.  Thus, the “specialness” of the Special Purpose Fund, namely 
to support fiscally weak local governments to contribute to the achievement of 
national priorities, has been lost.  What is happening is that areas with sufficiently 
high levels of fiscal capacity to enable them to contribute to the funding of national 
priorities, are also receiving DAK funds.  In other words, the criteria used to allocate 
the DAK are defeating it purposes.  As Graphic 8 shows, 119 areas with fiscal indices 
above the national average (that is, with an index greater than 1) are included 
among the mumber of DAK recipients.  






The technical criteria change frequently.  The second criterion for receipt of DAK 
allocations requires recipient areas to meet a number of technical requirements 
(and in this sense DAK grants are “conditional transfers”).  These requirements are 
put forward by the technical ministries which have been allocated DAK funding for 
their fields of activity. They change from year to year, as do the objectives set for 
funded activities. The criteria are are drawn up on the basis of input indicators 
which are rigid and do not necessarily accord with the needs of a particular 
recipient area – a situation which leads to unexpenditure of DAK allocations.  For 
example for deciding on DAK funding levels for education-related activities in 2009 
the central government used two criteria (the number of damaged primary schools 
and the local index of construction costs) and specified three program objectives 
(refurbishment and refitting of classrooms, upgrading of toilets and provision of 
teachers rooms).  By 2010, the number of criteria to be met had jumped to 16 and 
there were 7 program objectives.  
 
DAK criteria are complex and liable to political interference. The various criteria 
set down for the DAK involves technical ministries which oversight the program.  
The reange of criteria and technical requirements involved make it difficult to 
understand the process of selecting DAK recipients and leave the whole system  
open to political interference.  Moreover, the technical indices used by government 
ministries make use of a number of indicators which can be decided upon at will by 
the ministries involved. The criteria are hard to understand and difficult to model 
because the technical data used in their formulation is available only to the 
responsible ministries. Thus, local governments are hard pressed to predict likely 
DAK funding levels in the ensuing year.  Furthermore, no mechanism exists to 
enable the local governments to complain when DAK allocations do not meet their 
specific needs or are out of balance with the allocations with other areas.  
 
Delays in the finalization of the DAK’s technical criteria interfer with the 
budgetary cycle of recipient governments.  Article 59 of central government 
regulation PP No. 55/2005 states that technical guidelines for DAK programs should 
be approved no later than two weeks after the level of DAK funding has been 
approved.  But in practice the technical guidelines are often delayed and this 
situation leads to significant unexpenditure of DAK allocations. Furthermore, the 
guidelines are only finalized and approved after local government budgets (APBDs) 
have been approved, which means that DAK-funded activities do not accord with the 
provisions of  APBDs and can therefore only be implemented after the adoption of 
mid-year amended budgets (APBD-Ps).  
 
Tabel 5. Comparison of  Approval Dates of  Technical Guidelines &  DAK  Funding 
No Areas of Activity DAK Technical guidelines 






0 500 1.000 1.500 2.000
Indeks Fiskal 
Ribu 
Grafik 8 DAK Transfers (2010) Based on Fiscal Indices 
Rupiah per capita 
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1 Education 09/04/08 29/01/2009 01/02/2010 
2 Health  18/11/2008 26/112009 
3 Roads* 18/12/2007 18/12/2007 15/12/2009 
4 Irrigation* 18/12/2007 18/12/2007 15/12/2009 
5 Clean Water* 18/12/2007 18/12/2007 15/12/2009 
6 Sanitation* 18/12/2007 18/12/2007 15/12/2009 
7 Government Infrastructure  15/12/2008 26/01/2010 
8 Marine and Fisheries  10/12/2008 08/12/2009 
9 Agriculture  17/12/2008 08/10/2009 
10 Environment   31/12/2008 2009 
11 Family Planning  31/12/2008 26/11/2009 
12 Forestry 24/01/2008 29/10/2008 05/01/2010 
13 Village Infrastructure & 
Facilities 
 04/02/2009  
14 Commerce   27/012010 
 Approval of DAK Technical Guidelines 
 Min of Finance regulation 142/2007 171/2008 175/2009 
 Date of Adoption 20/11/2007 13/11/2008 11/11/2009 
Sumber: DAK monitoring reports  2009 (D-G Dana Perimbangan), Dept Finance 2010 
* Technical guidelines for 2007 also used in 2010 
  
 
Counterpart contributions are a burden to DAK recipient governments. 
Recipient local governments are required to make counterpart contributions 
amounting to 10% of their DAK allocations. Given that the fiscal capacity of local 
governments varies, having a uniform counterpart funding requirement places a 
particular burden on areas with low levels of fiscal capacity.  
 
The purposes of the DAK have been usurped by dana penyesuaian (adjustment 
funding) programs. The DAK is not the only program provising funding for specific 
programs in specific local government areas. Since 2008 has also been making 
provision for so called dana penyesuaian for virtually the same purposes as the DAK. 
The difference between the two is that, unlike the DAK, the dana penyesuaian 
program does not require recipient governments to make counterpart 
contributions. The Minister of Finance regulations which govern dana penyesuaian 
programs does not specify which areas should receive such funding and there is 
absolutely no reference to such funding in PP No. 55/2005. Following is a lits of the 
dana penyesuaian programs that have appeared so and the Minister of Finance 
regulations (PMK) establishing them: 
o Fund for Infrastructure and Public Facilities Funding (Dana Infrastruktur 
Sarana dan Prasarana (DISP)): PMK 81/2008 
o Fund to Strengthen Fiscal Decentralization to Speed up Regional Development 
(Dana Penguatan Desentralisasi Fiskal Percepatan Pembangunan Daerah 
(DPDF PPD): PMK 42/2009 
o Fund to Strengthen Local Infrastructure and Public Facilities (Dana Penguatan 
Infrastruktur dan Prasarana Daerah (DPIPD)) PMK 113/2010 
o Fund to Strengthen Fiscal Decentralization to Speed up Regional Development 
(Dana Penguatan Desentralisasi Fiskal Percepatan Pembangunan Daerah 
(DPDF PPD)): PMK 118/2010 
o Fund to Speed up Development of Educational Infrastructure (Dana 
Percepatan Infrastruktur Pendidikan (DPIP)): PMK 114/2010 
o Fund for the Strengthening of Local Infrastructure (Dana Penguatan 
Infrastruktur Daerah (DPID): PMK 2005/2011 
 
Table 6 illustrates the overlap which is occurring between the DAK and dana 
penyesuaian programs. Although the areas receiving dana pensesuaian differ from 
those receiving DAK funding, it nonetheless confuses the situation because of lack of 
informationi on the basis on which areas have been chosen to receive dana 
penyesuaian rather than DAK funding (which carried a counterpart funding 
obligation).  In 2008 five identifcal fields of activity were funded by both the DAK 
and dana penyesuaian programs and by 2009 that numberhad risen to 10.  In 2010 
four fields of activity received funding from three sources with three others being 
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funded by two programs.  By 2011 ninetenn of the areas of activity receiving 
fuinding from the DAK were also funded by both the DPID and the DPPID.   
 
 
Table 6 Comparison between DAK dan Dana Penyesuaian Funding 2008-2011 
No Bidang 2008 2009 2010 2011 









1 Education ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔   ✔ ✔ ✔ 
2 Health ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
3 Roads ✔  ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
4 Irrigation ✔  ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
5 Clean Water ✔  ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
6 Sanitation ✔  ✔  ✔ ✔  ✔ ✔ ✔ 
7 Government 
Infrastructure 
✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔  ✔ ✔ ✔ 
8 Marine and 
Fisheries 
✔  ✔ ✔ ✔   ✔ ✔ ✔ 
9 Agriculture ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔   ✔ ✔ ✔ 
10 Environment  ✔ ✔ ✔  ✔   ✔ ✔  
11 Family Planning ✔  ✔  ✔   ✔   
12 Forestry ✔  ✔  ✔   ✔ ✔  
13 Village Infrastructure 
& Facilities 
  ✔  ✔   ✔ ✔  




   ✔  ✔  ✔ ✔  
16 Regionial Fiscal 
Information System 
     ✔     
17 Village 
Transporation 
       ✔ ✔  
18 Housing Settlements        ✔ ✔  
19 Village Electricity         ✔ ✔  
20 National Borders 
Infrastructure and 
Facilities 
       ✔   
21 Transmigration          ✔ 
22 Dams          ✔ 
Source: Compiled by  Seknas FITRA 
 
The DAK competes with funding for central government functions or tasks 
which have either been delegated to the regions by way of “dekonsentrasi” or 
are co-administered as “tugas pembantuan” by the center and the regions.  
Article 108 of Law No. 33/2004 (which address transitional arrangement from the 
previous law to the new one) specifically states that funding for avtivities carried ou 
the regions on behalf of the center by way of dekonsentrasi or tugas pembantuan 
should be progressively transferred to the DAK and that a further government 
regulation should be issued to facilitate that transition. But that article of thw law 
has not been serioiusly addressed.  It took four years for the new regulation to 
appear and when it was finally enacted as PP No. 7/2008, it simply reiterated that 
the transfer of dekonsentrasi and tugas pembantuan funding would take place in 
stages.  This situation is evident in Graphic 8 in which there is no sign that funding 
for konsentrasi and tugas pembantuan is being transferred to the DAK.  Indeed 
dekonsentrasi and tugas pembantuan funding is proceeding apace and trending 
upwards. l  
 




Source: Compiled by Seknas FITRA on basis of national financial  statements 
Note: TP=tugas pembantuan and Dekon=dekonsentrasi. 
Shared Revenue Fund (DBH) 
 
The method used for the “proportionate” divvying up of revenue from taxation 
and natural resources between the center and the regions via the DBH has never 
been clearly explained.  From the time regional autonomy became a reality via Law 
No. 25/1999 concerning Fiscal Balance between the Center and the Regions and 
was subsequently modified in Law No. 33/2004, the proportions of revenue 
distributed via the DBH mechanism have not varied significantly.  Nor has the 
system ever been clearly explained. Local governments have not had any bargaining 
power and have tended to take at face value the proportions handed out to them by 
the central government.  Morevoer, local governments have not had relevant data 
with which to contest the appropriateness of the share they have been allocated.  
 
The DBH mechanism as it impacts on natural resources is not in accord with the 
spirit of the Constitution.  Article 33, paragraph 3 of the Constitution states: “the 
land, the waters and the natural resources within them shall be under the powers of 
the State and shall be used for the greatest benefit of the people”. In its judgement 
No. 3/PUU-VII/2010 on a review of Law No. 27/2007 concerning Coast Waters and 
Small Islands, the Constitutional Court expressed the view that as they applied to 
natural resources the words “the greatest benefit of the people” should be assessed 
against four yardsticks: 1) The usefulness of natural resources to the people 2) the 
evenness of the spread of the benefits of natural resources amonhg the people;  3) 
the extent to which the people participate in determining the benefits of natural 
resources; and 4) Repect for the right of the people, from generation to generation, 
to benefit from naturat resources. These citations make it clear that natural 
resources both as a source of national revenue and as a component of the DBH 
ontribution should bring equal benefit to all Indonesians.  The fact of “proportionate 
sharing” within the DBH mechanism indicates that its benefits are not being evenly 
shared.   
 
Does DBH really exist or not?  The aim of dana perimbangan is to lessen the fiscal 
gap between local government areas. On the basis of its import and the formulae it 
uses, it is clear that the DBH is fulfilling its purposed. Mcleod and Fadliya (2011)ii, 
have shown that DBH is a myth and does not actually exist as part of the dana 
perimbangan system.  Mcleod modeled transfers to the regions as follows:  
  
 Box .  Fadliya & Macleod’s Modeling of Regional Transfer Formula 
 
 DAU =  Basic Allocation (civil service costs) + Fiscal Gap (CF) 
o CF = Fiscal Needs  (Keb. F) – Fiscal Capacity (KF) 
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 DAU = AD + Keb.F – (PAD+DBH) 
= AD + Keb F – PAD – DBH  
 
 Dana Perimbangan = DBH + DAU + DAK 
= DBH + (AD + Keb F – PAD – DBH) + DAK 
= AD + Keb. F – PAD + DAK 
 
In this modeling DBH does not figure as a component of dana perimbangan transfers 
because,  even though it is formally part of the transfer system, it is a negative in the 
formula used to calculate the DAU.  This makes it clear that in DBH does not really 
exist.  The only areas to receive any funds from the DBH are those whose fiscal 
capacity is greater than their fiscal needs and their basic allocation (AD + Keb.F in 
the above modeling). It is appropriate to ask, therefore, why the DAU and the DBH 
exist as separate mechanisms with separate formulae, given that transfers received 
under them is the same and are discretionary in character.  
 
The DBH does not accurately reflect the regional potential. The DBH comprises 
income which was originally derived from the regions under the authority of the 
central government and which is subsequently transferred back to the regions on a 
“proportionate” basis.  This means that there is a close correlation between local 
GDP which reflects local economic growth.  But a look at figures for 2010 (Graphic 
9) shows that there was no such correlation between local GDP and DBH allocations 









Establishing a Fair and Transparent Fiscal Rlationship between 
the Center and the Regions  
 
 
Fiscal Decentralization: Principles and Policies 
 
The fiscal relationship between the central government and sub-national 
governments in a decentralized Indonesia must ne in conformity with fiscal systems 
in place at the national level.  Principles of good fiscal management must be the 
basis on which policies on fiscal decentaralizaiton are developed. Accordingly, the 
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Local GDP per capita 
Graphic 9 Per Capita DBH Transfers (2010) based on Local GDP 
per Capita 
13 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS ON REVISION OF REGIONAL FISCAL BALANCE FUNDING 
(DANA PERIMBANGAN) 
 
following principles must be reflected in every element of mechanisms used to 
transfer dana perimbangan to sub-national governments.  
 
Transarency: As applied to dana perimbangan transfers, the principle of 
transparency requires that such transfers have a detailed information base (both 
descriptive and quatitative) on the ways in which funds are received and disbursed 
and the mechanisms and rationales for making allocations to each recipient area 
and the formulae used in that process. All indicators and variables used in making 
calculations on any form of dana perimbangan must be publicly available. Such a 
situation would ensure that local governments or the public can, if they wish, 
reproduce the formulas and test the indicators on the basis of data supplied to them.    
 
Accountability: Applied to dana perimbangan the principle of accountability 
demands the establishment of a dispute settlement procedure for local governments 
to use and a funding process which can be held to account against its criteria and 
specified purposes.  Local governments could have cause for complaint if allocations 
made to them do not accord with relevant formulas, criteria or local conditions and 
potential.   What is needed, therefore, is institutional dispute settlement procedure 
which comprises representatives of the central government and regional 
representatives sush as members of the House of Regional Representaives (DPD).  It 
cannot be denied that the Constitution makes provision for the DPD to play a 
mediating role on issues related to the allocation of dana perimbangan.  
 
Participation: In cases when local governments have discretion on how to use dana 
perimbangan transfers, local communities should have the opportunity to have their 
say on the planning, implementation and evaluation of programs funded by those 
transfers. The use of dana perimbangan must be in accord with local needs and the 
aspirations of the people.   Thus policy frameworks for such transfers must include a 
legislated right for local communities to participate in planning and budgetary 
processes for such transfers and to be informed about how their inputs have been 
handled (were they accepted with or without qualification or why were they not 
accepted?). Legal protection must also be provided to minority and marginalized 
groups to ensure that they do not suffer discrimination and to protect their right to 
participate in dana perimbangan processesiii. 
 
Equlaity: The distribution of dana perimbangan among local government areas 
must be based on the principle of equality and thus should be targeted at meeting 
needs for public services rather than being focused on the supply side (e.g. more 
civil service positions or more infrastructure)iv.  The policy imperative for dana 
perimbangan up to now has been the reduction of fiscal gaps among local 
government areas. But, given the Constitutional mandates on the primacy of the 
welfare of the people and bearing in mind that government must implement the 
Constiution, it follows that the welfare of the people needs to be maximized in order 
to reduce the per capita income gaps among any given area’s population.  Because 
every citizen has the same need for a minimum level of services, expenditure of 
dana perimbangan should be based on providing that minimum level of basic 
services for every citizen.  
 
Money should follow functions. Fiscal decentralization is a necessary concomitant 
of the responsibilities that have been entrusted to local government areas with 
decentralization. Bhal (1999), says that many of the mistakes made in implementing 
fiscal decentralization can be sheeted back to funding distribution issues.  In 
particular, he argues, governments need to determine up front what funding is 
required at each level of government to provide the public services required and 
only after that should decisions be made about levels of funding required. Thus, the 
dana perimbangan system needs to be the sum of the level of funding required by 
each local government area to provide the locally required level of public services.  
So far, only around 33% of national revenue has been allocated as dana 
perimbingan, even though it is often stated in national financial statements that the 
nation spends up to 60% on allocations to sub-national governments (which include 
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dekonsentrasi and tugas pembantua funding, aid to the people and subsidies). But, 
bearing in mind that the provision of most public services has now been 
decentralized, it should be feasible to transfer a minimum of 50% of State 
expenditure to sub-national governments as dana perimbangan. It should be noted 
that any dekonsentrasi and tugas pembantua funding transferred to local 
governments should be included within the dana perimbingan system, as should 
direct community aid which has up to now has been a joint activity. 
 
Simplicity: The policy framework for dana perimbangan should be simple and easy 
to understand. Bhal (1999) identifies a numher of complexities that should be 
avoided in fiscal transfer systems to sub-national governments.  They include using 
allocation formula which are difficult to finalize because they are not supported by 
sufficient data; the need to make estimations because of the unavailability of data 
needed to finalize allocation formulae; and the use of data which may be available 
for one allocation period but cannot be updated subsequently because of the cost of 
the data collection processv. Bhal’s comments are corroborated by Indonesia’s 
experience with the DAU and the DAK.  The former depends on a lot of data (such as 
the humn development index (HDI)) which is not available every year, while the 
latter depends on technical implementation guidelines.  
 
Incentives and disincentives:  The dana perimbangan system must be able to 
encourage local governments to spend the funds transferred efficiently and 
effectively in pursuit of the basic objective of the decentralization process, namely 
the promotion of the people’s welfare. Incentives in the form of extra dana 
perimbangan should be provided to local governments which economize on civil 
service costs, have sound budgetary procedures in place and make measurable 
progress in improving people’s welfare. At the same time penalties should be 
imposed on thos governments which who  Daerah mendapatkan insentif dana 
perimbangan, jika melakukan efisiensi belanja pegawai, meningkatkan 
pendapatannya, serta tata kelola anggaran yang baik dan  mampu meningkatkan 
indikator kesejahteraan masyarakatnya. Sebaliknya, dana perimbangan harus 
memproteksi terjadinya pemekaran daerah dan belanja pegawai yang besar, dan 
lambat meningkatkan kesejahteraan warganya.  
 
A transfer framework which looks to the medium term: Certainly about future 
funding levels, particularly from dana perimbangan sources, would help streamline 
local government budgetary planning.  Given that local governments are still very 
dependent on central government transfers, the dana perimabagan policy 
framework should have a forward looking element which provides governments 
with forecasts of the amounts of dana perimbangan which they are likely to receive 
in the medium term (for the two years as a minimum).   
 
Outlawing new types of dana perimbangan: There has probably already been a 
high degree of political interference in the allocation of dana perimbangan. The 
establishment of new transfer programs not covered by law has the potential to 
compromise the achievement of the system’s main purpose of reducing fiscal gaps 
among local government areas.  Thus the legal framework for dana perimbangan 
needs to shut the door on the establishment of transfer programs not already 
provided for in law.  
 
 
General Purpose Fund 
 
Dana Alokasi Umum sebagai salah satu komponen dana perimbangan bertujuan 
untuk pemerataan kemampuan keuangan antar daerah dalam rangka mendanai 
kebutuhan daerah dalam pelaksanaan desentralisasi. Dana Alokasi Umum bersifat 
unconditional atau tidak memiliki syarat dalam penggunaannya sehingga  bisa 
dialokasikan sesuai dengan kebutuhan daerah. DAU dihitung berdasarkan alokasi 
dana dasar yang merupakan kebutuhan belanja pegawai dan celah fiskal yang 
merupakan selisih antara kebutuhan fiskal dengan kapasitas fiskal suatu daerah. 
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Formula ini yang mendorong terjadinya inefisiensi belanja pegawai karena 
ditanggung oleh DAU dan pembentukan Daerah Otonom baru, yang pembiayaannya 
juga akan ditanggung oleh DAU. Sehingga, DAU sebagai transfer yang bisa 
dialokasikan sesuai kebutuhan daerah menjadi tidak efektif karena habis terserap 
untuk kebutuhan belanja pegawai.  
 
Beberapa usulan perubahan dalam dana alokasi umum adalah sebagai berikut :  
 
 Besaran alokasi DAU diusulkan meningkat menjadi 30% dari Pendapatan Dalam 
Negeri (PDN) Netto. Argumentasi 30% PDN Netto, mengingat 70% lebih dari 
pendapatan negara diperoleh dari pajak dan sumber daya alam yang berasal 
dari daerah. Sementara konstribusi pajak seperti perdagangan internasional dan 
badan usaha negara serta hibah, tidak signifikan. Oleh karena, urusan yang telah 
didesentralisasikan lebih besar kepada daerah. Definisi dari PDN Netto juga 
harus dipertegas kembali ke definisi dalam UU No. 33/2004, PDN Netto 
merupakan Pendapatan Dalam Negeri dikurangi dengan Dana Bagi Hasil ke 
daerah.  Pemenuhan DAU 30% Netto dapat diberlakukan secara bertahap 
dengan memperhatikan dari kemampuan keuangan (budget constraint) dan 
kondisi perekonomian negara. 
 
 Pembagian DAU antara propinsi dan Kabupaten/Kota harus ditentukan 
berdasarkan proporsi pembagian urusan dan proporsional jumlah antara 
propinsi dan Kabupaten/Kota.  Karena Model pembagian 10% propinsi dan 90% 
Kabupaten/Kota tidak mempertimbangkan lebih cepatnya pertumbuhan Daerah 
Otonom Baru hasil pemekaran pada Kab/Kota dibandingkan propinsi. Padahal 
dari sisi jumlah, rasio propinsi saat ini hanya 6% dari jumlah Kab/kotavi. Selain 
rasio dari jumlah Pemerintah Daerah, proporsional DAU juga 
mempertimbangkan rasio dari urusan antara propinsi dan Kab/kota. Pada sisi 
lain, Kab/Kota sebagai ujung tombak pelayanan publik harus menanggung 
beban belanja pegawai yang lebih besar, karena mengakomodasi tenaga 
fungsional pelayanan publik seperti Guru dan Tenaga Kesehatan. 
 
 Formula DAU seyogyanya lebih sederhana dan mudah dipahami serta 
transparan. Artinya daerah atau publik mampu mensimulasikan formula ini 
untuk memperoleh kepastian DAU dan melakukan mekanisme komplain apabila 
DAU yang diterima tidak sesuai. Seluruh data, variabel yang dipergunakan 
sebagai dasar perhitungan DAU harus dipublikasikan atau di upload dalam 
website, atau menjadi lampiran yang menjelas diperolehnya alokasi DAU pada 
suatu daerah.  
 
 Untuk menghindari formula DAU menyimpang karena bias politik, maka 
diperlukan forum  atau kelembagaan dana perimbangan yang menentukan 
besaran DAU setiap daerah, sebelum diajukan ke Pemerintah untuk dibahas 
DPR. Kelembagaan ini terdiri dari unsur Pemerintah Pusat, DPD dan Pemerintah 
Daerah, serta kalangan independen.  Formula DAU harus secara jelas dan tegas 
diatur dalam Undang-undang, untuk menghindari terjadinya bias pada aturan 
turunan atau saat pelaksanaan.  
 
 Alokasi Dana Dasar yang merupakan kebutuhan belanja pegawai harus 
dihilangkan dalam formula DAU. Beberapa alternatif yang dapat dilakukan 
dalam penentuan alokasi dana dasar adalah sebagai berikut : 
o Hanya memperhitungkan celah fiksal: DAU = Kebutuhan Fiskal – 
Kapasitas Fiskal 
o Belanja Pegawai menjadi beban provinsi, sehingga Alokasi Dana Dasar 
hanya menjadi dasar pada formula DAU provinsi 
o Alokasi Dana Dasar (ADD) berdasarkan belanja pegawai diganti dengan 
sebesar 30% dari total DAU dibagi dengan seluruh jumlah penduduk, dan 
dikalikan dengan jumlah penduduk pada daerah bersangkutan.  Dengan 
rumus sebagai berikut:   
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ADDA = 30% Total DAU/Total Jumlah Penduduk  X  Jumlah PendudukA 
 
Sehingga formula DAU menjadi : 
 
DAU = ADD + Celah Fiskal (Keb. Fiskal – Kap.Fiskal) 
 
 Celah fiskal merupakan selisih antara kebutuhan fiskal dan kapasitas fiskal. 
Berdasarkan simulasi yang dilakukan Fadliya dan Macleod (2011), kapasitas 
fiskal yang merupakan perjumlahan Pendapatan Asli Daerah dengan Dana 
Bagi Hasil, sebenarnya Dana Bagi Hasil tidak dipehitungkan. Oleh karena itu, 
alternatif lain dari formula Kapasitas Fiskal suatu daerah cukup 
memperhitungkan PAD dan atau ditambah dengan PDRB per kapita. 
Kapasitas Fiskal = Indeks PAD (PAD suatu daerah/rata2 PAD Nasional) 
 
 Kebutuhan fiskal dengan menggunakan Indeks Penduduk, Indeks Luas 
Wilayah, Indeks Kemahalan Konstruksi, Indeks Pembangunan Manusia, dan 
Indeks PDRB per kapita, merupakan variabel proxy yang tidak 
mencerminkan kebutuhan daerah  secara riil. Grand Disain Desentralisasi 
Fiskal mengusulkan indeks ini digantikan dengan Analisa Standar Belanja 
pada pemenuhan Standar Pelayanan Minimal (SPM) tertentu. Lahirnya UU 
No. 25 tahun 2009 tentang Pelayanan Publik, mewajibkan adanya standar 
pelayanan yang harus dijadikan ukuran dalam pelayanan publik. Peluang 
Undang-undang ini, dapat mengakselerasi tersedianya SPM pada berbagai 
sektor seperti pendidikan dan kesehatan. Selain itu, Kementerian Keuangan 
juga telah memulai penggunaan ASB dalam penyusunan anggaran mulai 
tahun 2011. Metode perhitungan kebutuhan fiskal dapat menggunakan 
metode  ABC (Activity Based Cost) untuk menghitung analisa standar belanja 
dalam pencapaian suatu standar pelayanan minimal tertentu.  Setidaknya 
standar pelayanan minimal ini mencakup tiga jenis yakni; Pendidikan, 
Kesehatan dan Infrasturktur Dasar. Rumus dari kebutuhan fiskal dapat 
dijabarkan seperti ini: 
Keb.Fikal = ASB.SPMP + ASB.SPMK + ASB.SPMI 
 
  Keterangan:  
   ASB = Analisa Standar Belanja 
   SPMP = Standar Pelayanan Minimum Pendidikan 
 SPMK = Standar Pelayanan Minimal Kesehatan 
 SPMI= Standar Pelayanan Minimal Infrastruktur 
 
 Penggunaan formula kebutuhan fiskal berdasarkan analisa standar belanja 
suatu SPM  dapat dilakukan secara bertahap selama 5 tahun ke depan, 
dengan mempersiapkan data SPM dan kebutuhan dari ASB pada masing-
masing daerah. Untuk alternatif lain, sampai dengan tersedianya data SPM, 
formula kebutuhan fiskal, masih dapat menggunakan variabel proxy dengan 
mengganti beberapa variabel yang lebih relevan atau dekat serta data yang 
mudah tersedia. Variabel yang bisa digunakan diantaranya Indeks Luas 
Wilayah Daratan dan Laut, Indeks Gini Ratio, Indeks Kemiskinan, dan Indeks 
Kemahalan Konstrusi. Indeks Pembangunan Manusia sebaiknya diganti 
dengan Indeks kemiskinan, karena data IPM tidak bisa tersedia setiap tahun 
dan sulit untuk dikumpulkan. Sementara Indeks PDRB per kapita  diganti 
dengan indeks gini ratio, dengan argument PDRB per kapita tidak 
mencerminkan kondisi riil sebenarnya, sementara Gini Ratio dapat 
menggambarkan tingkat kesenjangan pendapatan antar penduduk. Dengan 
demikian rumus kebutuhan fiskal dapat dijabarkan sebagai berikut : 











Dana Alokasi Khusus 
 
Dana Alokasi Khusus (DAK) atau specific grant  merupakan dana transfer yang 
bersifat conditional. Sesuai dengan sifatnya, DAK dialokasikan untuk mendanai 
kegiatan khusus sesuai prioritas nasional pada daerah tertentu. Berbeda dengan 
DAU yang pengalokasiannya bebas sesuai kebutuhan Daerah, penggunaan DAK 
sudah ditetapkan bidang/sektor, bahkan kegiatan yang harus dilakukan.   
 
Pelaksanaannya DAK semakin jauh dari tujuannya. Prioritas DAK semakin banyak, 
sehingga  tidak jelas arah dari kebijakan yang akan dicapai.  Hampir seluruh daerah 
juga memperoleh DAK, karena penggunaan kriteria yang berjajar; umum (fiskal), 
Teknis dan khusus. Rumus yang rumit dan sulit dipahami, menjadikan alokasi DAK  
bias kepentingan politik. 
 
Beberapa revisi yang perlu dilakukan terhadap DAK adalah sebegai berikut : 
 
 Formula DAK, kriteria,  variabel, indeks dan cara perhitungan alokasi DAK 
harus dipublikasikan dan dapat diuji. Formula DAK sedapat mungkin juga  
sederhana dan   dengan data yang mudah diperoleh. Oleh karenanya, perlu 
kelembagaan yang bersifat lintas sektor dan mewakili unsur Pemda, Pusat, 
dan kalangan independen untuk menghindari terjadinya bias politik.  
 
 Untuk memastikan kepastian pendanaan bagi daerah dalam menyusun 
anggaran, maka DAK harus menggunakan Medium Term Expenditure 
Framework atau kerangka pengeluaran jangka menengah, minimal selama 2 
tahun ke depan.  Hal yang sama berlaku terhadap pedoman pengalokasian 
DAK dapat berlaku hingga tiga tahun dan dapat diperbaharui kembali. Hal ini 
juga dapat menjamin DAK dapat terserap secara optimal.  
 
Keb. Fiskal = TBR x {Ξ1ILW + α2ILL + α3IG + α4IK + α5IKK} 
Dimana: 
 TBR = Total Belanja Rata-rata APBD 
  α = Bobot setia[ variable 
 ILW = Indeks Luas Wilayah 
 ILL = Indeks Luas Laut 
 IG = Indeks Gini  
 IK = Indeks Kemiskinan 
 IKK = Indeks Kemahalan Konstruksi 
 Sehingga, DAU berdasarkan celah fiskal dapat diperoleh dengan 
formula berikut: 
DAUi = Bobot Daerahi X Total DAU Berdasarkan Celah Fiskal 
(70%) 
 
Bobot Daerahi = Celah Fiskali 
{Celah Fiskal 
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 Besaran alokasi DAK minimal 30% dari total transfer daerah. Dari alokasi 
DAK, yang diterima daerah,  40% diantaranya, merupakan alokasi yang 
diputuskan melalui mekanisme Musrenbang pada tingkat kecamatan atau 
media partisipasi masyarakat dalam perencanaan anggaran daerah. DAK juga 
dapat digunakan untuk membiayai kegiatan non fisik dengan batasan 30% 
dan 70% untuk fisik.  
 
 Kriteria penentuan alokasi DAK seyogyanya tidak sejajar dan selektif pada 
daerah tertentu, khususnya daerah perbatasan, pesisir, rawan bencana dan 
daerah tertinggal.  DAK hanya diperuntukkan bagi daerah yang memiliki 
kapasitas fiskal di bawah rata-rata  Nasional. Penentuan kriteria DAK tidak 
lagi berbasis input, melain berorientasi pada pencapaian Standar Pelayanan 
Minimal. Oleh karena itu, prioritas nasional yang menjadi bidang DAK perlu 
dibatas hanya pada tiga bidang, yakni pencapaian pelayanan pendidikan, 
pelayanan kesehatan, dan infrsatruktur dasar. DAK juga dapat diberikan 
untuk prioritas lintas sektor, seperti kemiskinan.  
 
 Program Nasional Pemberdayaan Masyarakat (PNPM) yang selama ini 
dianggap sebagai urusan bersama, sudah seharusnya direalokasi menjadi 
transfer DAK untuk bidang kemiskinan. Hal ini juga berlaku pada urusan 
daerah lain yang masih dialokasikan pada tugas pembantuan dan 
dekonsentrasi di berbagai Kementerian Lembaga harus dialihkan menjadi 
DAK. 
 
 DAK juga perlu mengakomodasi dana transfer yang selama ini tidak memiliki 
ruang dan masuk dalam kategori dana penyesuaian, seperti Dana BOS, 
Tunjangan Sertifikasi dan Tambahan Penghasilan Guru, serta Dana insentif.  
 
 Pemberlakuan dana pendamping seyogyanya tidak disamaratakan antar 
daerah. Batasan dana pendamping maksimal 5% dan besarannya ditentukan 




Dana Bagi Hasil 
 
Dari sisi penggunaan Dana Bagi hasil, sama dengan DAU yang bersifat unconditional 
transfer atau daerah diberikan keleluasaan dalam mengalokasikan sesuai 
kebutuhannya. DBH atau dikenal dengan sharing revenue terdiri dari bagi hasil 
pajak dan bukan pajak atau SDA. Dalam konteks dana bagi hasil pajak DBH 
diperlukan untuk mengatasi kesenjangan vertikal. Sementara DBH pada SDA masih 
menjadi pertanyaan serius. Daerah penghasil sumber daya alam adalah faktor given 
, konstituti mengamanatkan kekayaan SDA dikuasai oleh Negara untuk sebesar-
besarnya kemakmuran rakyat. Dalam konteks revisi perimbangan keuangan 
penghapusan DBH SDA khususnya yang berasal dari Migas dan Pertambangan patut 
dipertimbangkan, dan digantikan dengan dana pemulihan lingkungan dan 
kesejahteraan untuk mengatasi dampak lingkungan dan sosial pada daerah-daerah 
tersebut. Pembagian DBH dengan proporsi tertentu, sampai saat ini juga tidak 
memiliki argumentasi yang jelas. Pada sisi lain, berbagai proporsi perhitungan dan 
data yang dipergunakan untuk menghitung DBH sangat kompleks, dan tidak 
memiliki data pembanding, kecuali dari pihak pemerintah pusat.  
 
Beberapa usulan perubahan yang perlu dilakukan pada kebijakan DBH adalah 
sebagai berikut : 
 
 Memperjelas dan menyederhanakan argumentasi proporsi pembagian dari 
komponen Dana Bagi Hasil. Peraturan perundang-undangan DBH saat ini, 
tersebar diberbagai aturan lain dan aturan turunan teknis di 
Kementerian/lembaga terkait, sehingga sulit dalam melakukan sinkronisasi 
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dan pengintegrasian. Pengaturan DBH perlu menjadi satu pengaturan 
organik yang dijadikan acuan aturan kementerian teknis lainnya.  
 
 DBH Pajak terdiri dari PBB (Pajak Bumi Bangunan) Non Pedesaan Perkotaan, 
PPh orang pribadi, dan cukai rokok. Sampai saat ini belum ada kejelasan 
mengapa hanya pajak ini yang dibagi hasilkan ke daerah. Ada beberapa 
pertimbangan dalam DBH Pajak, yang memunculkan paradok. Kewenangan 
memungut pajak di daerah disatu sisi dapat menimbukan persaingan yang 
tidak sehat di daerah dan memunculkan iklim investasi yang tidak kondusif. 
Pada sisi lain, indikator desentralisasi fiskal adalah taxing power bagi daerah 
untuk mendorong peningkatan pemungutan Pajak. Pada beberapa Negara 
seperti Macedonia, Pajak Pertambahan Nilai dan Jepang untuk Pajak Badan, 
merupakan salah satu jenis pajak yang turut dibagihasilkan ke daerah. 
Sehingga perlu menjadi pertimbangan, Pajak Pertambahan Nilai  juga 
menjadi salah satu komponen Dana Bagi Hasil, yang diperhitungkan 
berdasarkan PDRB per kapita daerah tersebut. Belajar dari pengalaman Cina, 
model insentif pajak daerah dapat memacu pertumbuhan ekonomi. 
 
 Untuk mendapatkan legitimasi yang kuat dalam hal proporsi bagi hasil pajak 
dan komponen bagi hasil pajak, Pemerintah Pusat perlu melakukan forum 
pembahasan bersama dengan Daerah, untuk memperoleh konsensus secara 
nasional, yang dituangkan dalam Undang-undang. Model DBH pajak yang 
bersifat asimetris, juga memungkinkan dilakukan untuk memberikan insentif 
bagi daerah sebagai pemungut pajak dan membantu daerah lain yang 
memiliki fiskal rendah.  
 
 Perlu dipertimbangkan  DBH Non Pajak khususnya dari sector Migas dan 
Pertambangan sebagian dialihkanmenjadi endowment fund dan 
dikembalikan sebagai biaya pemulihan lingkungan dan dampak 
kesejahteraan sosial di daerah penghasil tersebut. 
 
 Persoalan yang kerap terjadi dalam DBH Migas adalah ketidakpastian yang 
dbagi hasilkan ke daerah, karena sangat tergantung dari fluktuasi harga 
minyak dunia. Ketepatan waktu dan jumlah menjadi keharusan yang perlu 
dipertimbangkan dalam penyaluran DBH Migas. Selain itu, mekanisme 
pengawasan 0,5% DBH Migas dialokasikan earmarked untuk pendidikan 
tidak efektif, karena terlalu kecil. Alternatifnya, earmarked diperbesar 
dengan cakupan lebih luas, seperti kesehatan, resiko lingkungan dan 
kesejahteraan daerah tambang, atau dihapuskan.  
 
 Dana Bagi Hasil Kehutanan terdiri dari Iuran Hak Penguasaan Hutan (IUPH), 
Provisi Sumber Daya Alam (PSDH) dan dana reboisasi. Terkait dana reboisasi 
usulah perubahan yang perlu dilakukan merubah proporsi pembagian 
menjadi 40% Pusat dan 60% Daerah, argumentasi ini terkait dengan 
komitmen REDD++ yang dilalakukan dan dampaknya dirasakan daerah. 
 
 Berbeda dengan formula DBH SDA lainnya, DBH Perikanan memiliki formula 
seragam untuk seluruh Kab/Kota. Karena potensi DBH ini tidak signifikan, 
maka kedepan DBH ini cukup diserahkan kepada daerah penghasil, atau 






Berangkat dari pengalaman dana insentif sebelumnya, keberadaan dana ini cukup 
efektif mendorong perbaikan  bagi tata kelola anggaran di daerah. Namun, indikator 
yang digunakan masih sebatas adminitratif dan belum menyentuh substansi 
terhadap efektifitas alokasi dan pencapaian tujuan otonomi daerah. 





Dana Insentif sebagai komponen baru dana perimbangan, bertujuan untuk 
mendorong efektivitas dan efisiensi pengelolaan anggaran daerah yang berorientasi 
pada pelayanan publik. Meski demikian, pemberian insentif juga harus diantisipasi 
agar tidak menjadi bumerang terhadap kesenjangan fiskal. Oleh karena itu, besaran 
dana insentif harus dibatasi maksimal 10% dari total dana transfer.  
 
Beberapa kriteria yang dapat dipergunakan pemberian dana insentif, seperti; rasio 
peningkatan PAD, rasio belanja modal, hasil audit, dan kemajuan peningkatan 
Standar Pelayanan Minimal, penurunan angka kemiskinan, selain kriteria yang telah 
digunakan selama ini; ketepatan waktu APBD dan hasil audit BPK. Kriteria ini dapat 
diberlakukan secara bertingkat ataupun berjajar.  Dana Insentif dapat diberikan 
dalam bentuk matching grant.  Misalnya, Daerah yang mampu meningkatan PAD Rp. 
10 milyar akan mendapat dana insentf sebesar 10%-nya atau Rp. 1 milyar. Skema 
ini juga dapat diintegrasikan dengan kriteria lainnya. Sebagai insentif dana ini, juga 
harus bersifat block grant  yang pegalokasiannya diberikan keleluasaan bagi daerah 




Tipologi Skenario Arah Perubahan  
 
Arah perubahan Undang-undang Perimbangan Keuangan Pusat dan Daerah, dari 
hasil studi dan situasi yang berkembang, setidaknya dapat dipetakan menjadi empat 
skenario dengan tipologi; konservatif, moderat, liberal dan radikal.  
 
 
Konservatif. Skenario konservatif pada perubahan kebijakan dana perimbangan,  
terbatas pada sinkronisasi dengan peraturan perundang-undangan lainnya. Seperti 
diketahui revisi Pajak dan Restribusi Daerah dalam UU No 28 tahun 2009, Pajak 
Bumi Bangunan (PBB) dan Bea Perolehan Hak atas Tanah dan Bangunan (BPHTB), 
tidak lagi sebagai komponen Dana Bagi Hasil, dan menjadi pajak daerah. Begitu juga 
dengan adanya UU No 39 tahun 2007 tentang Cukai dan Tembakau, yang menjadi 
bagian dalam komponen DBH bagi daerah. Dengan skenario konservatif, tidak ada 
perubahan dalam formula dan komponen dana perimbangan selain dari implikasi 
kedua UU di atas. Terbuka peluang, dalam skenario ini untuk mengakomodir 




Moderat. Tipologi kedua yang lebih bersifat moderat, selain sinkronisasi terhadap 
peraturan perundang-undangan, dalam skenario ini  komponen dana perimbangan 
tidak berubah; DAU, DBH dan DAK, namun formula di dalamnya mengalami 





Gambar . Tipologi Skenario Arah Perubahan Dana Perimbangan 
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Liberal. Perubahan kebijakan dana perimbangan yang bersifat liberal setidaknya 
komponen dana perimbangan dapat berkurang atau diganti dengan jenis dana 
perimbangan lain. Terdapat dua alternatif dalam tipologi ini. Alternatif pertama 
adalah; dana perimbangan hanya terdiri dari dua komponen: DAU dan DAK. 
Argumennya, seperti yang diuraikan pada bagian DBH, sebenarnya DBH tidak 
diperhingkan dalam perumusan dana transfer dan berpotensi untuk melanggar 
konstitusi. Sementara untuk alternative kedua, DBH dirubah dengan Dana Insentif 
Daerah yang diberikan pada daerah-daerah progresif dalam mencapai tujuan 
otonomi daerah.  
 
Radikal. Skenario terakhir adalah tipologi yang radikal dan sulit kemungkinan 
besar dapat terjadi. Dalam tipologi ini, setiap daerah memiliki dana perimbangan 
yang bersifat asimeteris antara satu dengan yang lainnya. Artinya daerah memiliki 
posisi tawar dalam menentukan perimbangan keuangan pusat dan daerah, atau 
dengan kata lain otonomi khusus yang juga mencakup sistem desentralisasi 
fiskalnya. Tipologi ini sulit diwujudkan karena setiap dana perimbangan antara satu 
daerah dengan pemerintah pusat harus ditetapkan dengan Undang-undang, 
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